Appropriating Technology
The Whole Earth Catalog and Counterculture
Environmental Politics
Andrew Kirk " We are as gods, and might as well get good at it." -Stewart Brand, The Whole Earth Catalog, 1968.
When Stewart Brand issued his clarion call for technological acceptance in the opening lines of the first Whole Earth Catalog, the American enviro~ime~ital movement was in the middle of significant ideological and political reorientation. Until the mid-1960s, most environmental advocacy aimed at preseniing American wilderness from industrial development and urban encroachment. En\lironmental activists from John Muir to ~o w a r d~a h n i s e r focused the environmental debate on the problems of illdustrial technology and constructed a sharp dichotomy bebveen nahire and human civilization. In this ideological tradition, wilderness became the ultiluate symbol of environmental purity and abundance ~vith the polluted modern technological city its antithesis. This bipolar, often antiniodernist, frarneivork senred conser--vation and preservation activists well in early fights to convince the American public of the reality of scarcity and the necessib for presenation of some forestlands and remote natdral treasures.' This simple didhotom). was less effective when applied to increasingly coniplex environmental and social politics after the mid-1960s.
Followi~ig the 1964 passage of the Wilderness Act, environmental activism was enmeshed in the social struggles, political upheaval, and cultural te~lsio~is of the 1960s. A new generation of counterculture environmentalists struggled to resolve long-standing tensions between the modernist faith in Progressive reform and the antirrlodernist distrust of tech~~ology and desire to return to a simpler time. The success of the wilderness nioveme~lt created an ideological crisis for environmentalists who found it increasingly difficult to define their movement in terms of progress \.s. presen.ation. The spirit of cooperation that united a diverse coalition of environmental advocates behind the banner ofwilderness disintegrated in the years after the passage ofthe Wilderness Act, and environmental politics became increasingly cornplicated and the boundaries of the debate harder to define.' Almost immediately after the successful passage of the Wilderness Act, wilder~iess ceased to be a defining environmental issue. As the 1960s progressed, Anlericans increasingly focused less on presening a pristine nature and more on preserving the whole environment.
The tensions between modernist desires for a technological fix and antimodernist dreams of a wilderness utopia, allvays simmering below the surface of wilderness politics, came bubbling to the surface again in the mid-1960s. A new generation of co~~nterc~ilture environmentalists, invigorated by New Left politics, attempted to move beyond the progress vs. preservation debate and redefine the parameters of the environmental movement. Counterculture environmental politics embraced the seemingly contradicton notioil that the a~ltirnodernist desire to return to a simpler -.
tinle hen humans rvere more closely tied to nature could be achieved through technological progress. Couiiterculture environmentalism simultaneously encompassed both anti~nodernsi~n and modernism. No\\-here is this apparent contradiction more visible than in the pages of the Whole Earth Catalog (nac)ivhere primitive
~~. o o d
supplies for counterculture neo-Luddites share the page stoves and sun~ivalist Lvith personal computers, geodesic domes, and oscilloscopes.~ Inside the covers of Ira<:, the seemingly neat bipolar ivorld of hventieth-centun en\-ironmental politics becomes a messy inelange of apparentl!. incongruous philosophies and goals.
Prior to the rise of the counterculture e~lvironi~le~italists, hventieth-century enviror~rnental politics only appearedto be neatly bipolar. In fact, the jarring juxtapositions 011 the pages of I\FC only highlighted old and deep tensions in ,L\merican environmental politics. Hen? 'Thoreau \vas a pencil designer and entrepreneur. John Muir began his adult life as an inventor locally renolvn for his mechanical genius, and Aldo Leopold \\-as a scientific forester. A11 of them struggled to reconcile their modernist epistemoloa and technological enthusiasm Lvith their antimodern desire to restore purity to nature. Enviro~linental historians are lvell aware of these struggles but tend to do~vilplay the co~nplex relationship behveen technological enthusiasm and enviro~ime~ital ad~rocacy, stressing instead the ways these and other environ~nentalis~ tra~lsceilded materialisin and technocracy and offered alternative visions for American society.
Historical actors in the drama of t\vei~tieth-centun. environmental advocacv are often rated on a sliding scale according to the purihr of their wilderness vision. using this system, most environmental historians have ranked 'Thoreau, Muir, and Leopold high on the scale for their early, and seemingly complete, con\-ersio~ls to the uilderness ethic. Like fundamentalists, environmentalists and environmental historians love their prodigal soils-if 1-ou never saw that "fierce green fire," you might as rvell go home. Those who fail to make the full con\.ersion are generally left out ofthe canon. Anlbivalent conservationists \vho questioned the ~vilderness trope are ignored or ranked low on the scale of significant environmental figures.' The Lvilderness purity test tends to aim analysis of environme~ltalis~n toward the areas where environme~ltal politics appear black and white, and the actors in the drama are easier to pigeonhole. 'I'l~is overenthusiasrn for wilderness prodigals is counterproductive and helps foster a misleading sense of ideological purity in environmental politics that is not supported by the historical record. Historian William Cronon's "trouble wid1 \vilderness" stems from his beliefthat by venerating a injthically pure wilderness Lve cede ground in the rest of the environn~e~lt to purity in wilderLvhere most of us li1,e.j Giving ness philosophy similarl!~ causes problems for environinental histoq. It makes it too easy to paint American perceptions of technology and the environment in black and white when shades ofgray often prevail-as ifyou have to choose between wilderness or civilization. The bipolar division of the environment into pure wilderness and impure even.thing else has deeply compromised enviro~lrne~ltalism and sometimes skews environmental history. A look at w~c a n d the counterculture political milieu from which it grew can provide a ~rrelcome corrective to the wilderness trope in environmental histon,.
To understand post-1960 environrnentalisrn, ei~rlironmental historians niust turn away from John Muir and Aldo Leopold and look Inore closely at E. F. Schurnacher, Anlory Lovins, Murray Bookchin, Stewart Brand, and the generation of en\ Tironme~l-' talists who struggled to craft an environmental philosophy that recognized that huinaris "were as gods, and might as well get good at it."
Whole Earth's Counterculture Roots
Popular representations of counterculture envirorimentalists often include stereotypical back-to-nature communes complete with bearded wilderness advocates and naked children draped in flowers living off edible plants. It was not uncommon for younger environmentalists inspired by a renewed interest in the life and writings of Thoreau, Muir, and an emerging group of countercultural eilvironmental prophets such as Gary Snyder to drop out and take to the ~voods. During the 1960s and 1970s, many counterculture environmentalists did in fact reject the modern world oflargescale technological syste~ns in favor of a simpler, more primitive, and environmentally conscious lifc~tyle.~ At the samc time, other counterc~ilture environmentalists moved in an entirely different direction. Influenced by New Left politics, this faction critically reevaluated lo~igstandin~ assumptions about the relationship between nature, technolog!, and society. In particular, these environmentalists replaced the wilderness focus that do~ninated 1960s environme~italisni with a more encoinpassisig ecological sensibility that embraced new technologies. In the late 1960s and 197os, technologically rninded counterculture e~ivironmentalists helped reshape the American environmental rr-tovement, infusing it with a youthf~il energy and providing it with a new sense of purpose and direction. These new co~~nterculturc environmentalists embraced alterr~ati~.e technologies as a solution to contemporary concerns about poll~ition, overpop~~lation, and the realization that America was entering a new phase in its development.
This new phase was envisioned as a "post-scarcity" economy, wherc advanced industrial socicties theoretically possessed the means to provide abundance and freedom and reconcile nature and technolog if only they choose to do so.; Led by Xew Left social theorists such as Herbert Marcuse and Murray Bookchin, post-scarcity adherents shared the beliefthat "the poison is . . . its own a n t i d~t e . "~ In other words, technolo@ used a~iiorally and unecologically created the social and environmental problems of inclustrial capitalism. Technology used morally and ecologically could create a re\~olutio~-t that illspired a utopian future. 'The Neal Left critics emphasized that social and environ~ne~ltal problerlis in America stemmed not from a lack of resources but from a misguided waste of the "technology of abundance."') If, these critics argued, the American people could be convinced to abandon their bourgeois quest for consumer goods, then valuable resources could be redirected toward establishing social equity and ecological harmony instead of consumerism and waste. In the late i96os, post-scarcity assumptiolis fueled a brief period of technology-based utopian optimis~n that profoundly influenced a generation of environmentalists.
This thoughtful reevaluation of the role of technology in American society and politics is perhaps the most significant and lasting contribution of the counterculture to American culture and a critical step in the evolution in envirorimentalism. The move away from antimodernism manifested itself in many ways, from Buckminster Fuller designing affordable and environmentally sympathetic geodesic domes to Steve Jobs and Steve Wozniak developing "personal" computers to put the potver of information in the hands of individual^.'^ Working toward si~nilar goals, other counterculture environ~nentalists and svmpathetic scientists and engineers focused on alter-. --native energy, earth-friendly design, recycling, and creative waste management as the best ways to subvert the large industrial structures they viewed as no st damaging to the environment and to attempt to equalize the ~vorld power structure. Whether they were building personal computers in their garage or designing cornposting toilets, the idea that technology could be directed toward shaping a brighter future became a driving force in environmental advocacy after 1970.
The utopian optimism and revolutionarq: political program of the New Left failed to become a part of the mainstream environmental movement. Consumed with the reactive fight against the Vietnam War and university bureaucracies, the predominantly campus-based New Left movement fragmented and disintegrated in the early 1970s. But renelved scarcity in the 1970s helped confirm the urgency of environniental concerns while tempering utopian ambitions that were based on post-scarcity. The politicized counterculture environmental movement sumived the New Left and reillailled active in a multifaceted attempt to construct an alternative societ).
The relationship between the counterculture, techno log)^, and the environment is complex. It would be a mistake to assume that all of those who considered themselves counterculturalists and enviro~lmentalists thought or acted alike. Even among those who advocated the use of technology to solve environmental problems, a clear prograin of action or thought was rare. Often, countercultural environnientalists seemed to occupy separate but parallel universes defined by [vhether they considered technology to be the problenl or the solution. The relationship behveen the counterculture and technoloe was always one of fundamental ambivalence. Counterculture e~lvironmentalists never constructed a unified philosopliy that united like-minded individuals and organizations under one banner. They were a dilrerse group with a wide variety of perspectives, ofteii pursuing opposed or mutually exclusive projects. What differentiated counterculture environmentalists from other environmental activists in the 1960s and 1970s was a shared desire to use environmental research, new technologies, ecological thinking, and environmental advocacy to shape a social revolution based on alternative lifestyles and communities, alternatives that lvould enable future generations to live in harmony with each other and the en\,ironment.
Counterculture environmeiltalists were not the first A~liericans to debate technolo a and the environment. The technology debate began in the Industrial Revolutio~i of the nineteenth century. While some Americans looked at advances in science and technology with a wary eye, many Americans viewed technology as beneficial and benign. This was particularly true for a generation of middle-class Progressive conservation advocates who believed that rational planning, expert management, and science were the keys to a sound environmental future. From amateur conservation advocacy groups to the utilitarian U.S. Forest Service of Gifford Pinchot, A~nerican consenlation advocates looked to science for solutions to waste and wanton destruction of scarce natural resources. For most of the twentieth century, most resource conservation advocacy stemmed from the notion that through science and the rnarch of progress humans could tame and control all elements of the natural world, stopping waste and maximizing productivit\.. This thinking inspired massive reclamation a~i d irrigation projects and experiments with che~nicals to rid the world of unwanted pests and predators. The steadfast faith in technology and the scientific worldview prevailed into the 196os.l'
In the decades following World War 11, attitudes toward technology began to change. W i l e never quite a mainstream trend, more A~nericans questioned the -dominant view of technology and progress. A catalyst for this reevaluation was horrifying devastation caused by use of the atomic bomb in Japan. Once the patriotic fervor of the war subsided, conservationists and intellectuals started discussing what it now meant that humans had the power to destroy the world. Books like John Hersefs Hiroshima, published i111946, graphically depicted the awesome destructive pobver of atomic weapons and inspired a growing segment to recognize the far-reaching enviro111uental i~nplications of modern technology. After years of turning out pro-war propaganda films, Holl~wood, along with a legion of science fiction writers in the 1950s, produced a steady stream of books and films presenting horrifying visions of technology run amok. h generation of A~nerica~ls born after World War I1 gren. up watching giant nuclear ants or other such mutants oftechnology destroying humanit) i11 movies such as Gordon Douglas's Tl~ern! (19jq) By the mid-i96os, a grolving segment of American socieb, particularly young Americans, eviriced ambivalence about technoloa. During the q o s , a sense ofgenuine terror over the evil potential ofscience ~vithout a social conscience gre\v.12 At the same time, older members of the conservation movement also found themselves increasingly alienated from the n,orld of rnodern atomic science, massive reclamation projects, and postwar consumer technoloa. They were distressed particularly by the consequences of technocratic thinking for A~nerican socieb and culture.
Within the co~isenlation movement, a growing ambivalence toward tech~lology turned into full-fledged tech~lophobia for man!!. Fear shaped much of the consemationist alienation from the poshvar m~orld; fear that the prornine~ice of the hard scie~lces, the expa~lsion of the space race, and the explosion of consumer technology de-emphasized contact with the nonhuman world. The consequences of nuclear technology for Alnerican society led conservationists such as John Eastlick to wonder ifAmericans had been "bli~~ded by the fearful brightness of the atomic bo~nb," and were now stumbling through life with little awareness of the enviroilniental and social degradation that surrounded thern.13
Despite discomfort with the modern world, most conservationists used modernist means to express and act up011 their antiinodernist revulsion. Even as their alienation --Appropriating Technology 379 from postwar technocracy grew, their Progressive-style faith in government agencies, a~i d protective federal laws continued to be staples.'4 For most of its history, the conservation movement embraced organizational principles and actions based on the idea of linear progress through Progressive enlightenment. At the same time, it viewed the history of the twentieth century as a steady decline toward chaos and environmental collapse, brought on by rampant population growth and unregulated technological expansion.'; Although these two ideals seemed to be diametrically opposed and irreconcilable, both shared the same roots as direct responses to concerns about the relationship betueen nature and technology in post-industrial America. By drawing on both traditions, sometimes consciously and sometimes not, posh%-ar conservationists and critics of technology attempted to reconcile dreams for reform with competing fears that the system was beyond repair. They \vere simultaneously hopeful and afraid.
Other critics of postwar societv, including a contingent of more radical environniental presenationists and prominent European and American intellectuals, were less incli~ied to search for con~promise and Inore ~villing to propose far-reaching structural changes. The most stunning of these critiques came from biologist Rachel Carson, whose explosive Silent Spring, published in 1962, explained in frightening detail the ecological consequences of humanity's attempt to control and regulate the en\liro~inient. ' Carson became the first of many to warn of an impending environ--mental "crisis." During the i96os, a series of influential books appeared lvarning of a11 apocalyptic future if the present course was not altered. Carson's fellow biologist, Barry Commoner, several bestsellers, including Tlie Closing Circle, warning of the dangers of sacrifici~ig the health of the planet for temporary material gain.'' Three other writers also provided inspiration for a new generation of Americans who questioned the role of technology in causing social, economic, and environmental i~ijustice. Jacques Ellul, author of The Technological Sociep, asserted that "all embracing technological systems had swallowed up the capitalistic and socialistic economies" and were the greatest threat to freedom in the rnodern \~o r l d . '~ Ellul argued that there was "something abominable in the modern artifice itself." The system ivas so corrupt that only a truly revolutionary reorientation could stop social and enviro~ime~ital Man, decay.'9 Herbert Marcuse, in his popular One Din~ensional described a vast and repressive world technological structure that overshadowed national borders and traditional political ideologies.'" Marcuse popularized the insights of the Frankfurt school of Marxian philosophers and so~iologists.~~ Together Marcuse and Ellul provided a critical intellectual framework for Americans looking to construct alter~iatives to the scientific worldview.
The most influential of the structural critics of the technological society was Lewis Murnford. Munlford began his career as a public intellectual as a strong proporlent of science and technology. His 1934 classic, Technics and Civilization, influenced a generation a~i d strengthened the popular belief that technology was moving human civilization toward a new golden age.= Like most Progressive thinkers of the industrial period, Mumford envisioned a modern world where technology helped correct the chaos of nature and brought balance to ecology. In Technics,Mumford extolled the virtues of the ~nachine and painted a positive picture of how technology could reshape the world to eliminate drudgery and usher in an unprecedented period in histon. where machines and nature worked together for human benefit. But this prophet ofthe machine age rethought his views in the 1960s. Like Marcuse and Ellul, Mumford became increasingly alarmed about the power of large technological systems. As Mumford looked around at the world of the 1960s and 1970s he worried that the ascendance of the "megamachine" boded ill for human ~ocie$.~? The "machine," once the symbol of progress toward a more balanced world, emerged as a metaphor for describing a seemingly out-of-control capitalist system.'+ The preoccupation with technology and its consequences became one of the central features of 1960s social and environmental movements, and of the counterculture in particular. In 1968, Theodore Roszak released his influential study of the youtll movement, The Making ofa Corli~ter Culture.;? The counterculture was a direct reaction to "technocracy," which Roszak defined as a "society in which those who govern justik themsel~res bjr appeal to technical experts, who in turn justifc. the~nselves by appeals to scientific forms of k n o~l e d g e . "~T h e counterculture radicals of the s96os, he argued, were the only group in America capable of divorcing themselves from the stranglehold of 1950s technology and its insidious centralizing tendencies. Roszak's position on technocracy mirrored Ellul and Marcuse. For Roszak the most appealing characteristic of the counterculture was its rejection of technolog) and the systems it spawned. Charles Reich, in his bestseller The Greening of Anlerjca (s970), also highlighted the youth movement's rejection of technolog as a fiindamental component ofthe counterculture ideologv? For both Reich and Roszak, -. bureaucratic organization and complexit). made the technocracy evil. From the perspective of Roszak, Reich, and much of the younger generation, the problem ~rith America stemmed from that realization that there \vas nothing small, nothing simple, nothing remaining on a human scale.
'This bigness and bureaucratization concerned British economist E. F. Schumacher, ~vhose popular book Small Is Bearltifi~l(i973) became a model for decentralized humanistic economics "as if people mattered."" Of all the structural critiques of technological sj,stems, Schurnacher's provided the best rnodel for constructive action and was particularly influential in shaping counterculture e~lvironmentalism. Unlike more pessin~istic critics of the modern technocracv, Schumacher assured that by striving to regain indij~idual control of economics and environments, "our landscapes [could] become healthy and beautiful again and our people . . . regain the d i g n i~. of man, ~v h o kno\vs hi~llself as higher than the animal but never forgets that noblesse oblige."'"he key to Schurnacher's vision was an enlightened adaptation of technoloa.. I11 Snlall Is Beautih~l, Schu~nacher highlighted what he called "intermediate technologies," those technical advances that stand "halfway behigee11 traditional and modern technology," as the solution to the dissonance beheen nature and technolo@.
-.
in the modern \vorld.iO These could be as simple as using modern materials to construct better windmills or Inore efficient portable water turbines for developing nations. The key to "intennediate technologies" was to apply advances in science to specific local con~n~unities and ecosystems. Schurnacher's ideas were quickly embraced and expanded upon by a wide range of individuals and organizations, often ~vith ~i l d l y different agendas, \rho came together under the banner of a loosely defined ideology that became known as "appropriate technolog" (.\7).
Appropriate technology emerged as a popular cause at a conference on technological needs for lesser-developed nations in England in 1968.3' For individuals and organizations concerned with the plight of developing nations, Schumacher's ideas about intermediate technologies provided a possible solution for promoting a more equitable distribution of wealth while avoiding the inherent environmental and social problems of industrialization.3'Appropriate technology quickly became a catchall for a wide spectru~n of activities involving research into older technologies that had been lost after the Industrial Revolution and the developme~it of new high-and low-tech small-scale innovations. The most striking thing about appropriate technol-0 0 , according to historian Samuel P. Hays, was "not the mechanical devices themselves as the kinds of knowledge and management they implied." Alternative technology represented a move away from the Progressive faith in expertise and professionalization and toward an environmental philosophy predicated on selfeducation and individual experience.;?Alternative technolog) also represented a viable alternative to wilderness-based environmental advocacy.
The ATmovement was also bolstered by the New Left. Particularly influential were the writings of eco-anarchist Murray Bookchin. Bookchin provided a critical political framework by situating the quest for alternative technologies rvithin the framework of revolutionary New Left politics. In books such as Our Syr~thetic Environment (1962) and Post-Scarci4.Anarchisrn (1971), he argued that highly industrialized nations possessed the potential to create a utopian "ecological society, with neLv ecotechnologies, and ecocommunities."~+ From this perspective, the notion of scarcity, a defining fear of the consemation movement, Lvas a ruse perpetuated by "hierarchical society" to keep the niaiority froin understanding the revolutionary potentialities of advanced technolom. More than most New Left critics, Bookchin -.
also clearly linked revolutioiiary politics with environmentalism and techno lo^. ' 'Whether now or in the future," he wrote, "human relationships wit11 nature are always mediated by science, technoloa and kno\vledge."35 By explicitly fusing radical politics and ecoloa, the New Left provided a model for a distinctly counterculture environnjentalisn~. From the perspective of the New L,eft, pollution and enviro~lmental destruction were not only a matter of avoidable waste but a symptom of a corrupt econon~ic system that consistently stripped both the environment and the average citizen of rights and resources.3"
Although the utopian program of Bookchin and the New Left ultimately failed to capture the hearts of most environme~ltalists, it did help establish a permanent relationship for many between environmental and social politics. This linking of the social, political, and environmental in the 1970s paved the way for new trends of the 1980s such as the environmental justice movement. For inner-city African Americans and others who felt alienated from the predominantly white middle-class environ~llental groups such as the Sierra Club or the Wilderness Socieb, the New Left vision of environmental politics provided inspiratio11. Bj. connecting ecological thinking with urban social issues and radical politics, the New Left introduced environme~ital-ism to a new and nlore diverse group of urban Americans who had felt little connection to the wilderness and recreation-based advocacy of the conservationlpreservatio~l movernent. Bythe early-1970s, the neo-Luddites in the 14nierican environmental moveme~lt had ceded ground to a growing number of appropriate technologists. This new group of counterculture radicals, environmentalists, scie~ltists, and social activists recognized the liberating power of decentralized individualistic technoloa. The i\.r movernent \\.as varied and diffuse nit11 much disagreement even among its adherents about how to define their ideoloa. The term meant different things to different groups, but they generally agreed that an "appropriate" technolog. had the follo\\.ing features: "lon~ investment cost per work-place, low capital investment per unit of output, organizational simplicity, high adaptability to a particular social or cultural en\.ironment, sparing use ofnatural resources, low cost of final product or high poteiltial for emplo)me1it."3~ Ail appropriate technoloa. \vas cheap, simple, and ecologically safe. 'The proponents of appropriate technology also agreed on the basic idea that alternative technologies could create Illore self-sufficient lifes$les and ne\v social structures based on dernocratic control of innovati011 and communitarian anarchism. For supporters ofappropriate technoloo, the most radical actio~l against the status quo n.as not throwing b o~~l b s or staging sit-ins but fabricating wind generators to "unplug from the grid."
The move toward appropriate t e c l i n o l o~ represented a significant break for the counterculture and the environmental movement. A new breed of young env' 'ironmentalists built oil the ideas of Schumacher, Bookchin, Marcuse, and others to craft a iTel-J.' different political agenda from their technophobic predecessors in the environmental movenient. This new agenda found its best expression i11 the pages of a new publication. 'The M71ole Earth Catalog \vas run by young radicals \rho \ranted to fight fire with fire; they wanted to resist technocracy and frightening nuclear and militan technology by placing the pobver of small-scale, easil!. understood, appropriate technology in the hands of anyone willing to listen.
A Counterculture Sears Catalog
No single institution or organization better represents the technological universe through which counterculhire environmentalists defined themselves than the Whole Earth Catalogarid its successor, CoEvol~~tior~
This eclectic and iconoclastic Q~larterb/.
publication became a nexus of radical environ~nerltalisrn, appropriate technology research, alternative lifestyle information, and communitarian anarchism. First published in 1968,as the AT movement burst onto the world scene, 1VEC brought a aide range of divergent counterculture trends under one roof. Commune members, computer designers and hackers, psychedelic drug engineers, and environmentalists were but a few of those who could find something of interest in the pages of WEC. The publication's founder, Stewart Brand, set out to create a survival manual for "citizens of planet Earth" and "hippie environmentalist spacemen."3~ According to Brand, ctxcwas a "movable education" for his counterculture friends "who were reconsidering the structure of modern life and building their own communes in the backwoods." Under his direction, Whole Earth and its successors extolled the virtues of steam-powered bicycles, windmills, solar collectors, and wood stoves, alongside new "perso~lal computers," satellite telephones, and the latest telecommunicatioils hardware. Brand and his follo\vers kvere convinced that access to innovative and potentially subversive inforrnatio~l and ellerg technologies \\?as a vital part of changing the cult~~ral perceptions that contributed to environmental decay. 1° Brand's creation perfectly captured the post-Vietnam cou~lterculture movement of the mid-19~0s lvith its emphasis on lifestyle and pragmatic activism over utopian idealism and politics. \\EC marketed real products, not just ideas, and the focus \$>as ala-ays on theoretically feasible, if not al\vays reasonable, solutions to real Ivorld problems. For Brand and his colleagues, Stop thei-Gallon Flush, a guide to stopping water ~vaste with simple household tecl~nological fixes, was just as revolutionan a book as Das Kapital.ql Brand's practical revolution appealed to the gro~ving numbers of disenchanted New Left radicals ~v h o tired of sitting in coffee houses endlessly debating politics but \vho still \vanted to somehow subvert the syste~n. The publishers of KEC inadvertently advanced the radical notion that by staying home from the protest demoilstration and modifying your toilet, building a geodesic dome, or a solar collector j.ou could make a Inore immediate and significant contribution to the effort to create an alternative future than through more conventional expressive politics.
In contrast to the downbeat rhetoric of the late 1960s campus-based New Left, Brand and his enthusiastic collaborators remained optimistic about a coming revolution brought about by appropriate technoloa.. Dran~ing on the optimism of utopian post-scarcity visions of the future, Brand and other alternative techno lo^ proponents Lvere representative of a new direction ~vithin the counterculture characterized by intellectual curiosity and a love for creative technical innovation. Inspired by the ~1.oi-k of Bucknlinster Fuller, Brand expanded the "outlan, area" of counterculture innovation atvay from music production and psychedelic drug research totvard areas such as alternative energy and i~lfor~nation Brand \vas hardly a pragmatechnolog.p tist; he was a dreamer. ~E C began with the working assunlption that large numbers of 14~nericans rvere willing to abandon their current lives and move into self-sustaining, ecologically friendly communities. The first issues of the catalog were aimed at those who were working to use the best of small-scale technology to literally disco~l~lect themselves from the infrastructures of mainstream society and relocate to rural or ~vilder~less promoted radically detached self-sufficiency as the ke!.
areas. '4t first, \~'Ec to a viable revolutionary politics.
No one better captured the optimistic spirit of appropriate technology as presented in the pages of ~J E C than the iconoclastic self-taught designer and Harvard dropout Buckminster Fuller. Born in 1895, Fuller alas venerated by the i97os, but still full of radical ideas and an inspiration to a younger generation.43 For more than four decades he had been on a personal quest to create a completely new way ofviewing design, construction, and the environment. Fuller wanted to reform the "human environme~lt by developing tools that deal more effectively and economically with evolutionarq. change."^ Although a prolific designer, Fuller is best kno~zn for the concept of"d~~n~axion" design. Fuller defined dymaxion as "doing the most with the least."+j His geodesic donie epitomized the ideal of appropriate technology, using the most sophisticated design principles and the latest technologies to make more with less. He was an acute observer of the natural world. Unlike most of his contemporaries, especially in the ig3os, Fuller saw the universe in terms of interconnected triangles and spheres instead of straight lines and boxes. The ultimate example of his design ideal \+,as the brilliant and elegantly simple geodesic dome. The domes consisted ofa series of linked triangles forming a sphere that proved to be so strong that it could be built with very lightweight materials and remain structurally sou~ld in virtually any size.
The geodesic dome was based on cornplex n~athen~atics and design principles, and at the same time a structure so uncomplicated that almost anyone could build one from materials at hand. The geodesic dome became the preferred do~iiicile for counterculture communes like Colorado's Drop City because the dornes were cheap, easy to build, often portable, and environmentally friendly.4"~uller's artful designs epitomized the post-scarcity ideal of appropriate technologies as the basis for alternative communities and alternative societies. At IEC, Brand published information on Fuller, Paolo Soleri, TVIoshe Safdie, and other designers and architects who utilized -design and technical innovation to create alter~iative realities.+;
In the early years, u~c articulated an appealing vision for those looking for a permanent retreat from the status quo. Individuals who planned their escape through the pages of LWC discovered a program of action where "choices about the right technology booth useful old gadgets and ingenious new tools, are crucial," but "choices about political matters are not."ts For appropriate technology enthusiasts, lifestyle became the primary form of political expression. In MEC, Brand assenlbled an almost mind-boggling array of informati011 on tools, science, products, services, and publications ranging from the mundane to the downright weird, but all somehow concer~ied with crafting alternative lifestyles that subverted traditional networks of political, spiritual, and physical energy. For those who encountered NEC, the experience u.as often a revelation. According to Gereth B r a n~~n , subsequently a staff writer for Not all counterculturalists, environmentalists, or appropriate technology advocates agreed with the radical self-sufficie~lcy message of NEC in the early years. The first w~cappealed to the dropout school of hippies and back-to-the-landers who took their political cues from the likes of Ken Kesey, who encouraged them to "Just. . .turn your back and say. . . 'Fuck It' and walk away."5" Years later, Brand realized that MEC'S uncritical enthusiasm for self-sufficiency and dropout politics in those early years may have caused harm. In Soh Tech, he wrote with some regret, "Anyone who has actually tried to live in total self-sufficiency. . . knows the mind-numbing labor and loneliness and frustration and real marginless hazard that goes with the attempt. It is a kind of hysteria."^' Despite Brand's concerns about an overemphasis on self-sufficiency and escapism, most readers of the MECnever took the message literally. The vast majority of the almost two million people tvho purchased copies of IVECin its first three years never left the ci$s, never abandoned society for a lonely exile. The message that most readers got from UEC was unbridled technological optimism, the idea that innovation and invention lvith a conscience could overcome even the worst social and environrne~ltal problems. It was this message, so profou~ldly different from the technophobia expressed by environmentalists and critics like Theodore Roszak that made I I ' E C S U C~a significant phenomenon. Brand and other proponents ofthe xr movement understood something about "technocracy's children" that Roszak did not: the youth culture of the 1960s and 1970s ivas, in the words of appropriate tech e~lthusiast and chronicler, Witold Rybczynski, "immensely attracted to technology."j2
From the beginning, w c a n d the xr rnoveme~lt as a whole directed that attraction i11 tu.0 distinct directions: the "outlaw edges" of alternative energy technology and information and comm~inications technology. Over the years, readers of the catalog could find careful descriptions of the Vermont Castings "Defiant" wood stove closel) followed by the latest information on Apple computers. This incongruous juxtaposition made perfect sense to Brand. "The Vermo~lt Castings tool manipulated heat, the Apple tool manipulated information." "Both cost a few hundred dollars, both were made by and for revolutionaries who wanted to de-institutionalize society and ernpower the individual, both embodied clever design ideas," all characteristics of appropriate technology. According to Brand, the ability to manipulate energy and illformation were necessaq to change the syste1n.~3 The only way one could hope to cast off the chains of the industrial world was to steal the keys to the kingdom. Acquiri~lg the knowledge to manipulate energy in particular was viewed by supporters of appropriate technology and a growing faction of the environ~nental movemeilt as a crucial step in freeing oneself from existing structures of oppression and environmental degradation and enabling self-sufficiency.
With this broadened agenda in ~n i n d , the energy focus at Whole Earth and then CoEvolr~tiori Quarterl,shifted from low-tech basic tools, the wood stove or individually crafted hand saws, to much more sophisticated alternative energy solutions such as solar, geothermal, biogas and biofuels, and high-tech wind harnessing devices such as the ever popular "Gemini Synchronous Inverter." Brand and crew drew inspiration from groups like The New Alchemists who were pushing the edges of appropriate technology and putting the latest alternative energy technologies into active use in their laboratories on Prince Edward Island and Cape Cod. 54 Other organizations explored appropriate technology from a variety of perspectives. They researched new household tech~lologies such as conlposting toilets, affordable greenhouses, and organic gardening techniques along with alternative energy technologies. While the research of individuals and organizations working in the area o f m varied greatly, all involved shared the common goal of using technical research to enable simpler more ecologically sensitive lives and econonlies of a human scale.
The concentration on alternative renewable enera at WEC, the New Alche~ny Institute, and other organizations reflected a larger shift in direction in the American environmental movement as a whole. The energy crisis of the early 1970s brought a realization on the part of environmentalists that Inany of the ecological problerns of the postwar era were either directly or indirectly linked to the acquisition and distribution of energy. Long lines at gas stations and soaring fuel prices brought horne the reality of finite energy resources. This renewed realization that scarcity was once again a real and long-term problem forced courlterculture environmentalists to reevaluate the aspects of their technological enthusiasm derived from 1960s Ne\v Left notions of a post-scarcity world.
By the 1nid-i970s, it was clear that post-scarcity was a long way off. The move away from post-scarcity politics toward an appropriate technology philosophy that recognized scarcity and reformulated utopian radicalism paved the way for AT to move into the mainstream. The energy crisis of the 1970s forced millions ofAmericans to reevaluate their environmental positions and helped the environmental movement clramatically expand its base. Environmental organizations working in the area of . Yr were poised to provide a new vision of environme~ltal activism to this broadened audience ofconcerned Americans. The community of i~ldividuals and organizations working on alternative energy solutions became particularly influential during the 1970s.
All of the new and renewed energy technologies featured in the pages of IW:C became compo~lents of what British physicist Amory Lovins referred to as the "soft path." Lovins popularized the soft path to energy solutions in a widely read and highly controversial 1976 article in the prestigious journal Foreig1lMairs.'5 For Lovirls and his supporters the soft path was the moral alternative to an American "federal policy. . .
[that] relies on rapid expansion of centralized high technologies to increase supplies of energy."j"~llstead of increasing centralization, soft path proponents supported decentralized appropriate technologies and urged western nations, specifically the United States, to direct their research toward renewable alternatives and explore the possibility of shrinking the system to provide a more equitable relationship with developing nations. Appropriate soft technologies such as passive solar, the use of new technologies combined with traditional building materials to heat buildings with energy from the sun, were available irnniediately to all who were interested.
Lovins emphasized that the benefits of soft tech were accessible for regular citizens of the western world and easily transferable to developing nations as well. Si~nple passive solar techniques like painting a south-facing wall black and covering it with glass, could radically decrease the dependence on large energy systems.5; Soft path proponents pointed to several significant energy technologies with long and productive histories that fit perfectly with the ideal of easily accessible renewable energy for a rnodern world. Most of the soft path solutions to modern energy problems were retooled versions of preexisting technologies. None of these older technologies better captures the spirit of the soft path energy n~oven~ent than the venerable windnlill.
to power ships and soon after as an efficient means for the mechanization of food production and irrigation. For thousands ofyears, cultures all over the globe relied on wind power to mill their grains, drain their lowlands, draw water from aquifers, and saw their lumber.rq In America the windmill became an emblem of self-sufficiency as farmers and ranchers moved onto the arid plains and niastered the technology of the windmill in order to suwive far from established services and energy sources. Americans quickly discovered that windmills could be fabricated out of a \vide variety of locally available materials and constructed cheaply from mail order plans. As early as 1885 windmills generated electrical power. Early researchers lear~ied that windmills were an excellent source of electrical power on a small scale, and even small ~vindmills could easily provide enough electricity for a home or small business. Preexisting windmills could be retrofitted with electrical generators and provide polver to a remote farm or mill while retaining the capacity to pump water or grind wheat.5~ While many adopted the windmill as a permanent source of power, wind e n e r g never became the standard that Inany thought possible. Wind power faded from view for most of the tiventietli ce~itury.
The energy crisis of the 1970s renewed the interest in wind energy. One of the reasons that wind never went mainstream \vas because of an inability to regulate the wind. The power from ~vind generators ebbed and flowed, and the fickle winds never maintained a schedule. This made wind a poor substitute for hydroelectric or coal turbines, which could sustain a constant and manageable flow of energy for large systems and power grids. Soft path supporters were unconcer~led about the proble~ils of ivind power for large s!.steins. O n the contrary, they sought sources of power that Lvere better suited to small systems. Like E. F. Schumacher,~ovins and other soft tech proponents believed that the ability to construct small-scale self-sufficient systems provided individuals and communities with a closer connection to the earth and a greater degree of control over their lit,es. The ivindmill was the type oftech~lology that could enable one to use the latest research in electric power generators and new materials such as fiberglass to build ~nachines that produced no pollutants and provided essentially free and limitless energy. For soft path proponents the potential ofthe u.indmill was both practical and political. Disconnecting yourself from the power grid was the first step toivard a cleaner environme~lt and a move toward reevaluating all of the large systems that dominated the economy and daily life of developed nations. The key to the politics behind soft path and .-\r science was the notion that real change came not from protest but from constructing viable alternatives to the status quo starting with the basic elements of human life: food, energ, and shelter. Lovins's credentials as a professionally trained scientist lent credibility to the .~i . rmovement and caused both opponents and supporters to articulate carefully their energy positions. Brand approved not only of Lovin's ideas but his terminology as well: "'Soft' signifies that something is alive, resilient, adaptive," Brand mused, "maybe even 10vable."~ By the m i d -q o s , soft path energy research into solar power, wind, geothermal heat, biogas conversion, and recycled fuels moved to the forefront of the environmental and ~. r .
movements.
At the same time that a growing il~imber of environmentalists explored different paths toward decentralization through renewable energy development, others worked in the second area of the "outlaw edge": information technoloo (IT). For Brand, alternative energy was important, but 11was where the real action was. As he later expressed it, "~nforniation iechnology is a self-accelerating fine-grained global industry that sprints ahead of laws and diffuses beyond them."61Brand was intrigued by what he Ealled the "subversive possibilities" of technologies as diverse as recording devices, desktop publishing, individual telecommu~lications, and especially personal con~puters. He joined a growing group of counterculturalists who had a deep respect for innovators like Steve Jobs and Steve Wozniak, who were designing and then using their computers to push what Brand referred to as "the edges of the possible and per~nissible."~' Like Lovins and the soft path proponents, alternative information technology was viewed, perhaps some~vhat naively, by people like Steve Jobs and Stewart Brand as a Ineans of personal empowerment. The mandate at Apple was to "build the coolest niachine you could imagine," something so different that people would rethink the role ofthe machine in modern life.h? The naming of the products suggested that these ~nachines were somehow more natural than earlier computers. Old computers were identified by acronyms and numbers, new computers were named Apple and were accessed through the "mouse." This was friendly technology, designed to be unthreatening and easy to use. The specifics of how information and con~mu~lications technology could become Lveapons in the war against the status quo u,ere never clearly articulated by .IT proponents. Optimistic counterculturalists held a general sense that the personal computer and other neu. technologies Lvere intrinsically radical and could change the world simply by existing. The details could be worked out later. In the meantime their contagious enthusiasm and inventive genius inspired a technological revolution that ultimately tra~lsformed the hnierican economy in unanticipated ways and created ideological paradoxes for the .;\.I-pioneers who helped spawn that re\,olution.
For many in the counterculture ofthe early 1960s, computers had represented the epitome ofall that was wrong with technology in the service oftechnocracy. During that era computers were giant humming machines that \%>ere immensely expensive and required a high level of technical expertise to operate. They were the heartless mechanized brains of oppression, used by IBM and the Pentago11 to design weapons of destruction and quantifi the body counts in Vietnam. Neo-Luddites dismissed the computer as a malevolent ~nachine of centralization and dehumanization. Critics argued that computers were nothing more than "low-grade mechanical cou~lterfeits" of the human mind, devices propagated by the "most morally questionable" elernents of socieb.'+ Many of the first purchasers of ~v~c w o u l d have agreed with these critiques. They had a hard time conceiving a role for computers in their utopian backto-nature communes. But other counterculturalists, including Brand, quickly recognized the potential of the new wave of microcomputers and personal information technology to link individuals and organizations to transform American socieo.. The u~idespread disseminatio~i of information was essential to the project of constr~icting alter~latives and transforming society. Long before most, Brand and others involved in the .IT movement realized that computers had the potential to help build a new cyber-cornmunit).. What, these pioneers wondered, could be more alternative than an electronic utopia, an alternative universe where individuals separated by huge distances could share ideas, images, and thoughts with thousands of other like-minded people all over the world? AT enthusiasts were some of the first Americans to go online, and the Whole Earfh 'LectronicL i n k ( N~~~) became one of the early attempts to create a "virtual ~ommunit~."~s successor, CoEvolution QuarBy the mid-i97os, IWC'S terly, was dedicating more space to information technology than any other subject. They were no longer alone.
Conclusion
Before the end of the i97os, organizations like the Whole Earth Catalog and The New Alchemy Institute brought together some of the most innovative members of the counterculture to attempt to reconcile nature and the machine. For Stewart Brand and other appropriate technology enthusiasts, the research they promoted, ill both alternative energy and alternative information systems, succeeded in substantially altering the way Americans thought about the power of technology as a benevolent force for environmental protection, ecological living, and personal liberation. In many ways the reconciliation of ecology and technology popularized by N E C provided a more integrated and realistic model for environmentalism. By demonstrating -that there were possibilities for a middle ground between nioderil technoloa. and environmental consciousness, the ,ATmovement contributed to the acceptance of e~lvironmentalism in mainstrealll Anierican culture.
Despite this success, the AT movement \+!as not without its ironic consequences. The liberal idealism that drove 'AToften failed to account for the degree to Lvhich even small-scale and individualistic ideas, such as the personal computer, could vev rapidly be incorporated into and even strengthen the ven systems they were designed to subvert. In 1980, Alvin Toffler published his hugely popular book The Third Wave, which argued that the world was on the brink of a third industrial r e~o l u t i o n .~~ According to Toffler, this third revolution would grow out of the transformation of information technologies and would have profound consequences for industry and socieb. In many nays Toffler's vision was remarkably accurate. Information technologies have reshaped the American economy and socieb at an incredible pace. One of the most disturbing consequences of the counterculture environmental technolorn movement is that it helped launch this revolution and the new industrial -.
giants it spawned. The young counterculture or counterculture inspired entrepreneurs who started their careers pushing the ''outla\v edges" of the "possible and permissible" are now billionaires who run major corporations such as Apple, Intel, and Microsoft that dominate the American economy. Many of the radicals of yesterday have become the capitalist elite of today.
We live now in an age of technological systems of a level of complexity that makes the once threatening technological structures of the 1960s look antiquated and benign. One of the central notions of the . 4movement was the belief that access to innovative information and energy technologies was a vital part of changing cultural perceptions and social conditions that contributed to environmental decay. Today the "outlaw edge" of technology that inspired the counterculture is more often occupied by new industrial giants such as Intel. Corporations whose factories drain millions of gallons ofwater a day out of ancient desert aquifers to wash the silicon chips that power personal computers, with little concern for the effect on the environment and high-powered stafflawyers to fight off grassroots environmentalists who protest6' Examples like this lend credence to declensionist readings of the counterculture and environmentalism after the landmark victories of the 1960s. But the relationship betueen counterculture environmentalists and technology was always arnbivale~lt. It should come as 110surprise that the legacy of their technological revolution is also anibivale~lt.
While the .AT revolution may not have played out the \yay New Left theorists expected, the majorit\. of the ' 31, initiatives have had a11 overwhel~ninglj~ positive impact on American culture and American environmentalism and offer a suggestion for ho\v to move enviro~l~llerltalisn~ out of the cvilderness. T h e pronlotion of rene~v-able e n e r a resources and energ, consenration through technological invention provides one exarnple of success. Energy-efficient houses, thermal Lvindows, solar power, and high-efficiency electrical devices have become ~videly accepted standard features ofAnlerican culture. Curbside recycling and the proliferation ofpost-consunler uaste recycling ha1.e also gained approval and beco~lle a part of daily life. Many of these technologies and services that seei-11 so obvious and sensible that they go unnoticed today resulted from the radical innovation of counterculture environmentalists. Whether they went back to the land, or into the laboratory, they infused e~ivironmentalisin lvith a n optimistic hope that one day the nagging question of how to reconcile the tension behveen the moderrlist desire to exploit the progressi1.e potential of technological inno\,ation with the a~ltimodernist desire to presenre the natural world might be resolved through politicall?. enlightened technical innovation.
Andrew Kirkis 
Notes
1. In this essay I use the term antimodernis~n to group individuals and organizations who defined themselves in opposition to the prevailing t w e n t i e t h -c e~t belief in progress through tech~lological innovation. .4ntimodernists in the conservation and presemation movements rarely rejected the modernistiProgressive ideal that societies are improvable, they sirnply rejected the notion that irnprol-ement required looking forlvard to new technologies to solve old problems. Carhart has often been criticized for his failure to support the Wilder~iess Bill at a time \vhen his influence and access to a national audience n7as at a high point. Carhart argues convi~lcingl!. that wilderness as defined by the Wilderness Society did not really exist in any pure state, but it u-as an "experience" a construct that lived "\I-ithin vour mind," rather than in a particular place. carhart refused to support the \Vilderness Bill in 1964 because he felt that arguing for ~llderness purl& mould be a de facto concession to those \\I10 sought to de\ elop lands not cons~dered pr~stine 6 T h~s dnd the u~c o \ \ e s sect~on on counterculture en~ironmental~sm a great dedl to an 
